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Abstract 
The Web 2.0 has become a buzzword that is used to illustrate a wide range of online activities 
and applications. In fact, Web 2.0 enhances tremendously the chance to detect and re-examine 
cognitive, social psychological and interpersonal communication models. 
Moreover, cognitive dissonance is a psychological phenomenon which refers to discomfort 
felt at a discrepancy between what you already know or believe, and new information or 
interpretation. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to debate the following questions: do Web 
2.0 create cognitive dissonance? In what extent? What are the consequences for younger 
people? And, does computer ethics may help? 
 
Introduction 
The Internet has a number of striking features. It is instantaneous, immediate, worldwide, 
decentralized, interactive, endlessly expandable in contents and outreach, flexible and 
adaptable to a remarkable degree. It is egalitarian, because anyone with the necessary 
equipment and modest technical skill can be an active presence in cyberspace, declares his 
message to the world, and expects to be heard. According to users tastes, it lends itself equally 
well to active participation and to passive absorption into a narcissistic, self-referential world 
of stimuli with near-narcotic effects. Therefore, it can be used to break down the isolation of 
individuals and groups or to deepen it, because Internet use embraces “eroding boundaries 
between the real and the virtual, the animate and the inanimate, the unitary and the multiple 
self” (Turkle 1997: 10). 
Cyberspace provide us with an interesting opportunity to observe and re-examine cognitive, 
social psychological and interpersonal communication models (Riva, 2002), as well as 
theoretical arguments referring to personality structure and dynamics (Amichai-Hamburger, 
2002) in the context of emotional experiences, interpersonal and group behaviour. Plus, the 
special characteristics of Web 2.0 makes a unique environment, at least as interpersonal 
communication is concerned. It is an experience equated with the psychological state of 
presence (IJsselsteijn, Freeman and De Ridder, 2001), a concept that has regularly been 
investigated regarding human sensations in virtual reality. This subjective experience, which 
is reflected through psychological and behavioural measures (Insko, 2003), creates a sense of 
being there (IJsselsteijn and Riva, 2003). So, why Internet makes adolescents tick? Suler 
(1998) pleads the following features: identity experimentation and exploration (adolescents 
are struggling with their “self” in a intense way); intimacy and belonging (during adolescence, 
humans experiment intensely with new intimate relationships, which Internet allows); 
separation from parents and family (teenagers search for their own identity separate from their 
parents, and online interaction engages such ambivalence); venting frustrations (adolescence 
is a period of “storm and stress”, and anonymous behaviours is a Internet reality). 
All theories of social development understanding have recognized the influence of social 
interaction on social understanding, however in different ways and most of them account an 
individualistic perspective. It has seemed that the only possible alternative is to contrast 
individualistic accounts with unspecified statements about child “enculturation”. In this paper 
we argue for an alternative account for understanding mental state development, which 
integrates the social and individual dimensions of development (related to cognitive 
dissonance). We contend that a child does not merely adopt socially available knowledge, but 
rather, within social interactions develops and constitutes mental states. Our approach is based 
on Chapman’s (1999) reformulation of Piagetian theory, drawing on Vygotsky and 
Wittgenstein, and it is also consistent in some ways with other contemporary approaches 
(Hobson, 2002). Remembering Jean Piaget (1932), moral judgment is derived from the 
child’s understanding of conventional rules that eventually become internalized into an 
autonomous respect for law and order. Lawrence Kohlberg (1969) expanded upon Piaget’s 
work by adding higher stages of moral development. The highest stage of development 
according to Kohlberg’s model is reached when the individual surpasses the confines of 
“conventional” rules and can make impartial moral decisions based on “post-conventional” 
principles of justice. 
Therefore, our objective is to engage a discussion concerning the following questions: will 
Internet 2.0 enhance teenager’s cognitive dissonance? In what degree? What are the costs? 
And, may computer ethics provide answers regarding such challenge? As a concluding 
remark, we acknowledge the arguments concerning the paper structure that will allow such 
debate: the concept of cognitive dissonance; discussing Internet 2.0; Internet 2.0 versus 
cognitive dissonance; and, finally debating future measures. 
 
Development 
Cognitive dissonance 
Cognitive dissonance is a psychological phenomenon which refers to the discomfort felt at a 
discrepancy between what you already know or believe, and new information or 
interpretation. It therefore occurs when there is a need to accommodate new ideas, and it may 
be necessary for it to develop so that we become “open” to them. The theory is that 
dissonance, being unpleasant, motivates a person to change his cognition, attitude, or 
behaviour. This theory was first explored in detail by social psychologist Leon Festinger 
(1957) in his book, “A theory of Cognitive Dissonance”. Festinger still argues that there are 
three ways to deal with cognitive dissonance, which did not consider mutually exclusive: one 
may try to change one or more of the beliefs, opinions, or behaviours involved in the 
dissonance; one may try to acquire new information or beliefs that will increase the existing 
consonance and thus cause the total dissonance to be reduced; or, one may try to forget or 
reduce the importance of those cognitions that are in a dissonant relationship. Cognitive 
dissonance has been called “the mind controller's best friend” (Levine, 2003: 202). Yet, a 
cursory examination of cognitive dissonance reveals that it is not the dissonance, but how 
people deal with it, that would be of interest to someone trying to control others when the 
evidence seems against them, which means we need to address mental structures and 
processes. 
In fact, for several decades social psychologists have investigated such theme, and why we 
can feel so certain that our attributions are correct even when we have not given them careful 
thought. Kelley’s (1967) theory, it will help to introduce some simple terminology: action; 
actor; and, situation. First, there is the action, which is defined as the behavioural event we are 
trying to explain. Second, there is the actor, which is defined as the individual performing the 
action. Third, there is the situation, which is defined as the situational context in which the 
action occurs. When we make an internal attribution for an action, we infer that the cause of 
the action is inside the actor- that arises due to a “personal factor”. 
So, such concept embraces the need to debate attributional biases? In everyday life, we often 
are unaware of situational factors that influence our cognitions, emotions, and behaviours. 
This is because these situational factors activate schemas that cause us to automatically 
process information important for our responses to the situation. Because of the influence of 
schemas, this information is processed in biased ways. There are two main types of biased 
information-processing: cognitive biases; and, motivational biases. 
A cognitive bias is a tendency to think about and respond to events in particular ways because 
of the manner in which our minds process information. A simple cognitive bias can be seen in 
our tendency to perceive more easily things that change in the surrounding environment, than 
things that do not change (Ross, Amabile and Steinmetz, 1977). Our minds seem to have been 
“built” to rapidly perceive environmental changes, probably because aspects of the 
environment that are quickly changing tend to be more important for our survival than are 
aspects of the environment that do not change. Some argue that most cognitive biases exist 
because, on average, they produce cognitive, emotional, and behavioural responses that are 
adaptive. Finally, a motivational bias is a tendency to interpret events in ways that support our 
desires, needs, and wants. Motivational biases are adaptive in the sense that they help to 
decrease stress; but if they lead people to develop irrational beliefs about important aspects of 
the world, their ability to respond adaptively to their environments will be reduced (Lerner 
and Miller, 1978). 
 
Internet 2.0 
The Web 2.0 has become a buzzword that is used to illustrate a wide range of online activities 
and applications. However, to determine if it is a myth or hype, we need first to compare Web 
versus Web 2.0. Tim O'Reilly (O’Reilly, 2005) states that it is important to realize that Web 
2.0 is not a new web standard or a “paradigm shift” as the name implies, rather it is an 
evolution of technologies and communications approaches which have grown in importance 
since 2004-5. However, after almost three years of increasingly heavy usage by techies and 
the press, the writer Paul Boutin criticizes and argues that the term is in danger of being 
rendered useless unless some boundaries are placed on it (Boutin, 2006). In accordance to 
O'Reilly (2005) is best viewed as a collection of services of which a site may incorporate any 
or all of the following: blogs; RSS; more dynamic, interactive, responsive web sites often 
using AJAX technology; support for community participation forming a social network; 
encourage interaction and creation of user-generated content; enable end-user rating and 
categorisation of online content; fund free services through online ads; involve data and 
service exchange between differences sites (mashups). 
 
Blogs and wikis 
A well known definition of weblogs is given in Barger (2006): “a weblog (sometimes called a 
blog or a news page or a filter) is a webpage where a weblogger (sometimes called a blogger 
or a presurfer) logs all the other web pages that finds interesting”. In the following new 
technologies like permalinks and backtracks for better addressing and localization were 
introduced. Not only the content but also blogrolls and link policies shape the blogosphere 
(Bernstein, 2004). Downes even wrote (2006): blogging is something defined by format and 
process, not by content. Indeed, Gurak et.al. (2004) claims that the content of blogs combine 
musings, memories, jokes, reflections on research, photographs, rants, and essays, though we 
would argue that is not content that defines a blog, but the nature of such content, because all 
posts placed into a blog are time-stamped with the most recent post at the top, creating a 
reverse chronological structure governed by spontaneity and novelty. 
 
Really Simple Syndication (RSS) 
From a technology view point, Really Simple Syndication (RSS), also sometimes known as 
Rich Site Summary, is an Internet standard for publishing and exchanging content using 
XML. From a practical viewpoint it enables two things. First content can be syndicated or 
published on one site that originates on another site. Second, and of much greater interest to 
the e-marketer, it is relatively new method of distributing messages or alerts to subscribers 
(RSS Advisory Board, 2007). 
 
Dynamic web services or interactive applications often using AJAX technology 
These services are hosted on the web and cover a range of applications for information 
sharing, or blogging services. Such services often, but not exclusively use rapid application 
development using interactive technology approaches known as AJAX (Asynchronous 
JavaScript and XML) (Portal Java, 2008). Perhaps the best known Ajax implementation is 
Google Maps. 
 
Supporting participation 
Many of the new Web 2.0 applications are based on altruistic principles of community 
participation forming a social network. The best known Social networks are Wikipedia, 
MySpace and Bebo. Users can post text comments, images, audio clips (podcasts) or video 
clips. Some sites such as You Tube have an incredible array of video clips. 
 
Encouraging creation of user generated content 
Many of the social networks like MySpace are effectively an amalgamation of personal blogs 
containing text, pictures and videos, but with integrated messaging built in. However, another 
well-known example of collaborative content creation is encyclopedia Wikipedia. 
 
Enabling rating of content and online services 
One of the challenges regarding personal content creation is to find anything worth reading, 
listening to, or watching. Rating and tagging services may become a helpful tool here. Sites 
such as Blogpulse and Technorati perform such task, but their focus is blogs. 
 
Ad funding of neutral sites 
Many of the Web 2.0 services we have described are freely used by non fee-paying users, 
although site owners are always trying to monetise their sites through upgrades to 
subscription services with additional features. The classic example of this is the web mail 
companies such as Yahoo! Mail and Hotmail where subscription services are available which 
give more storage. 
 
Data and service exchange between sites through standards data exchange 
O´Reilly sixth aspect of Web 2.0 is technical, however significant, particularly for retailers. 
Web 2.0 gives the potential for integration of data between sites. Data integration can be 
facilitated by different technical standards such as XML, SOAP or .Net. What is relevant is 
that all enabled content and functionality to be shared between web sites. These are best 
known as the “mashups” between different data sources such as Google to give a new service. 
 
In conclusion, the new digital media are a rich frontier with opportunities and risks, 
particularly for young people. Through digital technologies, young people are participating in 
a range of activities, including social networking, blogging, gaming, instant messaging, 
downloading music and other content, uploading and sharing their own creations, and 
collaborating with others in various ways. We argue that five key issues are at stake in the 
new media, including identity, privacy, ownership and authorship, credibility, and 
participation. So, the need for ethics is unconditional, because ethics deals with the standards 
of human conduct that direct the behaviour of individuals and groups. These standards, in 
turn, are developed by the society within which the individual or group exists. However, 
having in consideration our research aims, we will not debate such issues, but to approach the 
consequences of unethical or dangerous behaviours such as cyberbulling or pornography into 
teenager’s socio-cognitive development. 
 
Internet 2.0 versus cognitive dissonance 
Internet usage has been conceptualized as the actual time in front of the computer as well as, 
the effects of perceived experiences in the cyberspace environment. Identity development was 
conceptualized as the Internet user’s degree of commitment to a specific conception of self. 
The concept of identity development has been widely studied by scholars from different 
disciplines, including the social psychological (Waterman, 1992), communication (Ponterotto 
and Pederson, 1993), and critical studies (Katz, 1995). 
Presently, research on identity is expanding to consider influences from the realm of the 
Internet (Turkle, 1997). Psychology and sociology approach the concepts of identity by 
different routes. The former lays its emphasis on the interior and interpersonal relationships, 
while the sociological viewpoint derives from interpersonal aspects and its concerns with 
intergroup and social-structural processes (Cote and Levine, 2002). In fact, in Cote and 
Levine’s view, self-concept is not synonymous with identity but when reflected on “becomes 
the schema content for the domains of either personal or social identity” (2002: 88). When 
this process of reflection is activated, it propels the individual forward through a series of 
developmental life stages or crises that results in the gain of a character virtue if successful or 
a character weakness if unsuccessful. This suggests that the essence of identity is formed 
through the interplay of the social and the psychic. 
Identity formation involves the individuation process and normally occurs between the ages 
of twelve and twenty. Erikson (1964) was careful to point out this stage of life is a time of 
searching for identity not necessarily achieving one. The inner search or “crises” takes place 
during a period of development called a psychosocial moratorium or a time between distinct 
phases of childhood and adulthood. This search also happens online. Therefore, if the identity 
crisis stage is left without a successful resolution, the young adult may adopt a negative 
identity or a condition known as “role confusion” or the inability to choose a direction in life 
beyond one that is superficial at best. A positive resolution of the identity crisis results in the 
person gaining the virtue of fidelity which is “the ability to sustain loyalties freely pledged in 
spite of contradictions in value systems” (Erikson, 1964: 125), which entails into the features 
that characterize cognitive dissonance. 
Plus, the link between cognitive dissonance and threat to self-concept has implications for 
interpersonal relationships as well. In a recent review of the literature, Baumeister, Smart, and 
Boden (1996) suggest that violence or aggressive tendencies are most commonly the result of 
a threat to self-concept. Because dissonance threatens the self-concept, it is logical to suggest 
that dissonant individuals would be likely to have alterations in interpersonal perception or 
assert themselves against another individual than would non-dissonant individuals. There has 
been relatively little research on the connection between cognitive dissonance and Internet 2.0 
behaviours, such as: virtual life (avatars), cyberbulling and suicide. Some of the potential 
readers may criticize such claim, justifying their critical argument demonstrating that some 
research has been made concern virtual life; however, we claim that cognitive dissonance is a 
new and urgent level of analysis, as the following news and reports demonstrate ethics has to 
become an imperative! 
In the context of text-based virtual environments, presence can be described as a feeling of 
getting lost or wrapped up in the representations of the text. Conceptualized as flow, presence 
refers to a merging of action and awareness, during which a person loses self-consciousness 
and a sense of time, focusing on the present and blocking out the past and the future. 
“Presence may also be said to entail an unselfconscious transparency in which a participant 
enters a virtual world, looking through rather than at the text that represents it” (Jacobson, 
2001: 654). This subjective experience, which is clearly reflected through physiological and 
behavioural measures (Insko, 2003), creates a sense of “being there” (IJsselsteijn and Riva, 
2003). Not surprisingly, the personal state of “being there” is clearly associated with the 
concept of empathy; that is, the ability to experience the “as if” condition (and emotional 
state) of another. If there is a “if”, or virtual, experience of presence induces dramatic 
cognitive, affective and motivational effects in the participating individual (Gaggioli et al., 
2003) and it apparently affects modes of thought. Furthermore, as Grigorovici (2003) has 
shown, emotional arousal, information processing and cognitive awareness while 
experiencing presence in an immersive virtual environment have significant effects on 
gullibility, which subsequently increases one’s vulnerability to persuasion! 
Cyberbullying is negative or hurtful behaviour using an electronic medium, repeated over 
time, which involves an intention to hurt the victim and a power differential between the bully 
and the victim. However, the term bullying has been defined in different ways by experts in 
the field. Many use a definition from Olweus, a pioneering researcher on bullying, which 
states, “a student is being bullied or victimized when he is exposed repeatedly and over time 
to negative actions on the part of one or more other students” (Olweus, 1993: 9). Other 
researchers have maintained that bullying involves an intention to hurt the victim, and a 
power differential between bully and victim (Coloroso, 2002). Most experts now agree that 
bullying must include these four features: 
• negative or hurtful behaviour- the behaviour of the bully is negative or hurtful to the 
victim. The bullying behaviour can range from nonverbal aggression, such as stares 
and teasing, to serious physical assaults. It can be direct or indirect; indirect bullying 
comprises behaviours that covertly cause distress to the victim, such as gossip, 
spreading of rumours, or encouraging others to exclude a person; 
• intent to harm- the bully means to inflict emotional and/or physical harm on the 
victim; 
• imbalance of power- the bully is more powerful (either real or perceived power) than 
the victim. The power differential in bullying may arise from differences in size and 
stature, but also from higher social status, a knowledge of vulnerabilities, or from the 
number of children colluding with the bully; 
• repeated over time- the negative behaviour towards the victim occurs repeatedly. 
 
Cyberbullying is behaviour that involves these elements and takes place via e-mail, cell 
phones that can send text messages, instant-messaging programs, Internet chat rooms, or web 
sites or blogs. In accordance, to Ybarra and Mitchell (2004), boys and girls are equally likely 
to be victims of cyberbullying. Teens of 14 years old and over are more likely to be targets 
than are children under 14. As Sullivan reports, the research on bully victims generally 
reveals that they feel guilt, shame, and a sense of failure because they cannot cope with the 
bullying (Sullivan, 2000). They tend to be unpopular and isolated. They are often depressed, 
worried, unhappy, and fearful, and significantly more neurotic than the norm. Being 
considered a common experience, bullying has long been considered to be almost a rite of 
passage, for many if not most children (Olweus, 1993). Bullies have various cognitive and 
emotional deficits, and victims also have various cognitive and emotional deficits. Many 
victims also demonstrate poor emotion regulation as they are highly emotionally reactive 
(Mahady, Craig and Pepler, 2000). This reactivity may be reinforcing for bullies, initiating a 
cycle of bullying and maintaining a high level of victim distress. 
Finally, concerning suicide information online and its consequences a recent study was 
conducted by Biddle et al. (2008). The authors of such study tried to determine whether it 
promotes suicide or not, and the influence regarding suicidal behaviour. To diminish the 
knowledge gap, the researchers collected 12 broad search terms gathered in part from 
interviews with those how had attempted suicide: suicide, suicide methods, suicide sure 
methods, most effective methods of suicide, methods of suicide, ways to commit suicide, how 
to commit suicide, how to kill yourself, easy suicide methods, best suicide methods, pain-free 
suicide, and quick suicide. 
The researchers then used these 12 terms on four of the top search engines (Google, Yahoo, 
MSN, and Ask) and looked at the first ten results for each search. The 480 results that this 
generated were consolidated to produce 240 unique web sites, which were then divided into 
14 groups that ranged from dedicated suicide site, pro-suicide to academic or policy site to 
news reports of individual suicides. The results varied by search engine: Google produced the 
most dedicated suicide sites by a wide margin (nearly twice as many as MSN), while MSN 
topped the list when it came to prevention sites and academic sites. But perhaps most 
disturbing was that the most frequent results were pro-suicide and the top sites provided 
information about methods, speed, and pain associated with suicide attempts! In fact, some of 
this websites presented personal stories regarding suicide attempts by teenagers. 
 
Computer ethics as a research field 
Ethics is the philosophical discipline that deals with theories of morality, or how we ought to 
behave toward one another. Traditional ethics offer us principles of not “harming”, but say 
little about how to apply them. However, in accordance to Górniak-Kocikowska (1996), 
understandably computer ethics is an applied ethics. It does not just talk about the proper 
principles of ethical thinking. Instead computer ethics considers ways of forming arguments 
and judgements on particular information technology related activities, such as: privacy, 
security, intellectual property, and so on. And certainly, through the codes of ethics of 
professional societies, computer ethics is highly normative, because it brings a direct message 
to computer professionals and users of ICT that they need to consider how they ought to 
behave. 
The first temporal remark concerning computer ethics is pos Second World War, due to the 
intervention of Norbert Wiener, one of the co-creators of computer technology, in its 
outstanding work “The human use of human beings” (1950). In his visionary book Wiener 
paid attention to the ethical problems that this technology might cause. Before Manner coined 
the concept “computer ethics”, Donn Parker and Joseph Weizenbaum also paid attention to 
the arising ethical issues in computer technology, however at different levels: Parker noticed 
the unethical behaviours of computer technologists and Wiezenbaum conceived the software 
ELIZA. After that, Manner created a “Starter kit on teaching computer ethics” (1978) and 
started his “underground movement” with Bynum, as stated by Bynum itself during 
ETHICOMP 2007. Manner’s arguments for a rationale computer ethics are well documented 
in his paper “Unique ethical problems in information technology” (Manner, 2003). His 
arguments are: certain ethical issues are transformed by the use of computers that they 
deserve to be studied on their own, in their radically altered form; or, that the involvement of 
computers in human conduct can create entirely new ethical issues, unique to computing, that 
do not surface in other areas. 
Manner still pleads a “weaker view” and a “stronger view” regarding computer ethics. 
Although the weaker view provides sufficient rationale, he draws mainly his attention on 
establishing the stronger view using six levels of justification: 
• level 1- computer ethics should be addressed because it will allow computer 
professionals behave in a responsible way. At a minimum level this rationale view 
maybe considered as a moral indoctrination. At a maximum level, it is weakened by 
the need to rely on an elusive connection between right knowledge and right conduct; 
• level 2- computer ethics should avoid computer abuse and catastrophes; 
• level 3- computing technology continuously creates temporary policy vacuums, and 
for that, anyone who studies computer ethics would have to perpetual task of tracking 
a fast-moving and ever-changing target. The other purpose of a computer ethicist is to 
be aware regarding policy frameworks clashes; 
• level 4- the use of ICT permanently transforms the degree of certain ethical issues, and 
for that an independent study is required; 
• level 5- the use of computers creates, and will create, novel ethical issues that require 
special study; 
• level 6- the rising issues on computer ethics are so broad and large that is enough to 
define a new field. 
 
However, another breakthrough on computer ethics can be found in James Moor’s (1985) 
article “What is computer ethics?” In that paper Moor argued that computers are logically 
malleable, and that characteristic makes them a revolutionary technology. That characteristic 
implies that through them it’s possible to manipulate and to do any activity that can be 
characterized in terms of inputs, outputs, and connecting logical operations. We should still 
refer that this property functions syntactically and semantically. Finally, another characteristic 
that Moor states is that information technologies are also informationally enriching. 
Is having in consideration such attributes, that Moor presents us his vision of computer ethics, 
which engages two components (Moor, 1985; 2003): the analysis of its nature and social 
impact; the corresponding formulation and justification of policies for the ethical use of such 
technology. The use of the concept “computer technology” is to demonstrate the broader 
vision of such technology. 
Another concept introduced by Moor was policy vacuums. Such phenomenon can be 
understood as the way that computing technology is being employed in a given situation, but 
people are puzzled how it should be used. Simultaneously, Deborah Johnson set also a course 
of computer ethics given origin to her book “Computer ethics” (1985). This was a book 
mostly dedicated to teaching, and for that reason, covering issues such as: intellectual 
property; software ownership and son. However, this book was reviewed in 1994 and 2001 
with the purpose to include the arising ethical issues outside professional settings, and that is 
clearly seen in her excellent introduction to computer ethics in the 1994 version: “computers 
are new species of old moral issues.” Also during the 90´s, Donald Gotterbarn (1992) devoted 
his attention to the social responsibility of computer technologists. 
Finally, in the late 90´s, Floridi and his colleagues (1999; 2006) developed the information 
ethics theory. The name information ethics is appropriate to Floridi´s theory, because it treats 
everything that exists as “informational” objects or processes. In fact, all entities will be 
described as clusters of data, that is, as information objects. More precisely, any existing 
entity will be a discrete, self-contained, encapsulated package containing because: the 
appropriate data structures, which constitute the nature of the entity in question, that is, the 
state of the object, its unique identity and its attributes; a collection of operations, functions, 
or procedures, which are activated by various interactions or stimuli (that is, messages 
received from other objects or changes within itself) and correspondingly define how the 
object behaves or reacts to them. 
At this level of abstraction, informational systems as such, rather than just living systems in 
general, are raised to the role of agents and patients of any action, with environmental 
processes, changes and interactions equally described informationally (Floridi, 2006). 
However, Tavani (2007) present some interesting critics to Floridi´s work. Having in 
consideration the previous statements, we may affirm that since its birth and evolution, 
computer ethics as a research field engages mainly three perspectives: 
• the human values approach- focus on human beings and their actions, intentions and 
characters (see the ethical theories section); 
• the professional approach- devoted to the social responsibility aspects regarding 
computer technologists; 
• and, the information approach- analyse information to create a new ethical theory. 
 
The human values approach was the first vision on computer ethics history, and obviously is 
based on Wiener’s work, and continued by Terrell Bynum as easily perceived for example in 
his latest work “Flourishing ethics” (2006), and also in Górniak-Kocikowska (see for 
example, 2007). The professional view is mainly supported by the work of Johnson (2001), 
and Gotterbarn (1992), which is criticized by Górniak-Kocikowska (2003). In fact, Kristina 
claims the idea of a code of ethics for computer professionals, but stating the need for a global 
ethics and other professions to intervene. Finally, Luciano Floridi (1999; 2006) is the leading 
author for information approach. 
ICT is the most human centred technology invented by mankind, and its evolution (for 
example Internet 2.0), requires a more intense human perspective, because individuals will 
hold responsibilities never glimpsed before. In that sense, integrate computer ethics into the 
educational process since early ages will be a plausible answer to such problem, as stated into 
the panel discussion during ETHICOMP 2007. 
 
Conclusion 
There is no doubt that technology use will continue and even escalate with time. Therefore, it 
is imperative continuously to examine our understanding of technology’s impact and 
implications for personal behaviour, because Martin and Holz (1992) considered a naive 
assumption that efficiency was the main purpose, not moral values! 
Australian performance artist Stelarc, who extends his body through physical and 
psychological means, shares the view that the body is immaterial to the mode and level of 
social interaction between people. Stelarc basis his work on the concept of extending the body 
to explore levels of existence: “where the body becomes the object for physical and technical 
experiments in order to discover its limitations” and where “electronic space becomes a 
medium of action rather than information” (Stelarc, 2005: 1). Stelarc believes in the freedom 
of form and sees that “as humans increasingly operate with surrogate bodies in remote spaces 
they function with increasingly intelligent and interactive images” (Stelarc, 2000: 560) for 
that, he firmly believes that technology is what defines being human (Stelarc, 2005: 3). 
Perhaps Stelarc is right with his critical outlook on the role technology has in society, to say 
that technology is what defines being human is to say that without it humans would operate 
and exist in an entirely different matter, which is disturbingly accurate. Such work 
demonstrates his concern about extending the physical body, but the same principle can be 
applied to the psychological extension of the mind. To move beyond the skin as a barrier, 
where the skin no longer signifies closure, relates remarkably to the very principle of living an 
alternate identity on the screen through the Internet. Contemporary society is moving beyond 
the skin as a barrier for identity, however, in the real world security and safety is dependent 
on physical appearances, so to remove this key element in the virtual world leaves deception, 
risk, and security, also open to individual interpretation that characterizes Internet 2.0. 
In that sense, we may claim that computer ethics provides important instruments to struggle 
against the cognitive dissonance imposed by Web 2.0, without forgetting the important 
contributions of moral psychology and neurobiology. Therefore, a good place to start is the 
following two levels of arguing: the relationship between moral psychology and information 
ethics; and, the bond between neurobiology and the human centred approach. 
Regarding the first level of arguing, the electronic format acts as if it establishes a kind of 
“psychological distance” between communicators and their audiences as well as, between 
people and property owned by others. This “distance” potentially impacts all four component 
processes involved in ethical action (Narvaez and Rest, 1995): ethical sensitivity can be 
reduced because the “distance” factor makes it more difficult to empathize with the audience 
or property owner who ultimately might be affected; ethical judgment may be altered because 
reduced empathy can reorder the priority of possible actions that could be taken such that 
what might be unethical in a different context; ethical action is influenced by a “no harm, no 
foul” mentality, which can lead to the occurrence of unethical behavior; ethical motivation 
can change because the “distance” makes it far less obvious who is and the lack for all. 
Finally the second level of arguing, each ethic has neurobiological roots that are apparent in 
the biological structures and circuitry of the human brain. Triune ethics theory derives its 
structure from MacLean’s (1990) Triune Brain Theory, which embraces three types of 
affectively-based moral stances that persons can take: one oriented to security (the ethic of 
security) and focused on self-preservation through safety, personal and in group dominance; 
another oriented to emotional engagement with others (the ethic of engagement), particularly 
through caring relationships and social bonds; and, the third (ethic of imagination), which is 
focused on creative ways to think and act socially. 
Given all the previous statements we may claim that cognitive dissonance is a reality with still 
unforeseen consequences, and computer ethics may help us to deal with such problem. 
 
Acknowledgments 
The authors of this paper would like to recognize the important comments performed by Nuno 
Sotero Alves da Silva through out the elaboration of this paper. 
 
References 
Amichai-Hamburger, Y. (2002), Internet and personality, Computers in Human Behaviour, 
18, 1-10. 
Barger, J. (1999), Weblog resources FAQ, robot wisdom, Robot Wisdom, on line at 
http://www.robotwisdom.com/weblogs/ accessed at 05.07.2008. 
Baumeister, R., Smart, L. and Boden, J. (1996), Relation of threatened egotism to violence 
and aggression: the dark side of high self-esteem, Psychological Review, 103, 1, 5-33. 
Ben-Zeev, A. (2005), Detattachment: the unique nature of online romantic relationships, In 
Amichai-Hamburger, Y. (ed.), The social net: Human behaviour in cyberspace, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 115-138. 
Bernstein, M. (2004), The social physics of weblogs, In Burg, T. (ed), Blog Talks 2.0, Books 
on Demands, Norderstedt, 15-22. 
Biddle, L. et al. (2008), Suicide and the internet, Public Health, 336, 800-802. 
Boutin, P. (2006), Web 2.0: The new Internet boom doesn't live up to its name, Slate Search, 
on line at http://www.slate.com/id/2138951/ accessed 05.07.2008. 
Chapman, M. (1999), Constructivism and the problem of reality, Journal of Applied 
Development Psychology, 20, 1, 31-43. 
Coloroso, B. (2002), The bully, the bullied, and the bystander: from pre-school to high 
school: how parents and teachers can help break the cycle of violence, HarperCollins, 
Toronto. 
Cote, J. and Levine, C. (2002), Identity formation, agency and culture, Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, New Jersey. 
Downes, S. (2004), Educational blogging, Educause Review, 39, 4, on line at 
http://www.educause.edu/apps/er/erm04/erm045.asp accessed at 05.07.2008. 
Erikson, E. (1964), Insight and responsibility, Norton, New York. 
Festinger, L. (1957), A theory of cognitive dissonance, Stanford University Press, Stanford. 
Floridi, L. (1999), Information ethics: on the theoretical foundations of computer ethics, 
Ethics and Information Technology, 1, 1, 37-56. 
Floridi, L. (2006), Information technologies and the tragedy of good will, Ethics and 
Information Technology, 8, 4, 253-262. 
Gaggioli, A. et al. (2003), Avatars in clinical psychology: a framework for the clinical use of 
virtual humans, CyberPsychology and Behavior, 6, 2, 117-125. 
Gorniak-Kocikowska, K. (1996), The computer revolution and the problem of global ethics, 
Science and Engineering Ethics, 2, 2, 177-190. 
Górniak-Kocikowska, K. (2007), From computer ethics to the ethics of global ICT. Library 
Hi Tech, 25, 1, 47-57. 
Gotterbarn, D. (1992), The use and abuse of computer ethics, In Bynum, T., Manner, W. and 
Fodor, J. (eds), Teaching Computer Ethics, Research Center on Computing and Society, New 
Haven, 73-83. 
Grigorovici, D. (2003), Persuasive effects of presence in immersive virtual environments, In 
Riva, G., Davide, F. and IJsselsteijn, W. (eds), Being there: Concepts, effects and 
measurements of user presence in synthetic environments, IOS Press, Amsterdam, Holland, 
191–207. 
Gurak, L. et al. (2004), Introduction: weblogs, rhetoric, community, and culture, University of 
Minnesota, on line at http://blog.lib.umn.edu/blogosphere/introduction.html accessed 
05.07.2008. 
Hobson, P. (2002), The cradle of thought: explorations of the origins of thinking, Macmillan, 
London. 
IJsselsteijn, W. and Riva, G. (2003), Being there: the experience of presence in mediated 
environments, In Riva, G., Davide, F. and IJsselsteijn, W. (eds), Being there: concepts, effects 
and measurements of user presence in synthetic environments, IOS Press, Amsterdam, 3-16. 
IJsselsteijn, W., Freeman, J. and De Ridder, H. (2001), Presence: where are we?, 
CyberPsychology and Behaviour, 4, 2, 179-182. 
Insko, B. (2003), Measuring presence: subjective, behavioural and physiological methods, In 
Riva, G., Davide, F. and IJsselsteijn, W. (eds), Being there: concepts, effects and 
measurements of user presence in synthetic environments, IOS Press, Amsterdam, 109-119. 
Jacobson, D. (2001), Presence revisited: imagination, competence and activity in text-based 
virtual worlds, CyberPsychology and Behaviour, 4, 6, 653-673. 
Johnson, D. (1998), Computer Ethics, 3rd edition, Prentice Hall, New Jersey. 
Katz, J. (1995), The invention of heterosexuality, Dutton, New York. 
Kelley, H. (1967), Attribution theory in social psychology, Nebraska Symposium on 
Motivation, 15, 192-238. 
Kohlberg, L. (1969), Stage and sequence: the cognitive-developmental approach to 
socialization, In Goslin, D. (ed), Handbook of socialization theory and research, Rand 
McNally, Chicago, 347-480. 
Lerner, M. and Miller, D. (1978), Just world research and the attribution process: looking 
back and ahead, Psychological Bulletin, 85, 1030-1051. 
Levine, R. (2003), The power of persuasion- how we`re bought and sold, John Wiley & Sons, 
New York. 
MacLean, P. (1990), The triune brain in evolution: role in paleocerebral functions, Plenum, 
New York. 
Mahady, W., Craig, W. and Pepler, D. (2000), Emotional regulation and display in classroom 
victims of bullying: characteristic expressions of affect, coping styles, and relevant contextual 
factors, Social Development, 9, 2, 226-245. 
Maner, W. (1978), Starter kit on teaching computer ethics, Self published, S.l. 
Manner, W. (2003), Unique ethical problems in information technology, In Bynum, T. and 
Rogerson, S. (eds), Computer ethics and professional responsibility, Blackwell Publishing, 
Oxford, 39-58. 
Martin, C. and Holz, H. (1992), Non-apologetic computer ethics education: a stratgey for 
integrating social impact and ethics into the cs curriculum, Computing and Human Values: 
Proceedings of the 1991 National Conference, Research Center on Computing and Society, 
New Haven. 
Moor, J. (1985), What is computer ethics?, Metaphilosophy, 16, 4, 263-275. 
Moor, J. (2003), Reason, relativity, and responsibility in computer ethics, In Bynum, T. and 
Rogerson, S. (eds), Computer ethics and professional responsibility, Blackwell Publishing, 
Oxford, 21-37. 
Narvaez, D. and Rest, J. (1995), The four components of acting morally, In Kurtines, W. and 
Gewirtz, H. (eds), Moral behaviour and moral development: an introduction, McGraw-Hill, 
New York, 385-400. 
O`Reilly, T. (2005), What is web 2.0, O`Reilly Net, on line at 
http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/oreilly/tim/news/2005/09/30/what-is-web-20.htm accessed 
at 05.07.2008. 
Olweus, D. (1993), Bullying at school: what we know and what we can do, Blackwell, 
Cambridge. 
Piaget, J. (1932), The moral judgment of the child, The Free Press, New York. 
Ponterotto, J. and Pedersen, P. (1993), Preventing prejudice, Sage, Newbury Park. 
Portal Java (2008), AJAX news, Portal Java, on line at 
http://www.portaljava.com/jnuke/bin/news/list accessed at 05.07.2008. 
Riva, G. (2002), The sociocognitive psychology of computer-mediated communication: the 
present and future of technology-based interactions, CyberPsychology and Behavior, 5, 6, 
581-598. 
Ross, L, Amabile, T. and Steinmetz, J. (1977), Social roles, social control and biases in social 
perception, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 7, 485-494. 
RSSS Advisory Board (2007), What is RSSS, RSS Advisory Board, on line at 
http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification accessed at 05.07.2008. 
Stelarc (2000), From psycho-body to cyber-systems, In Bell, D. and Kennedy, B (eds), The 
Cybercultures Reader, Routledge, London, 560-576. 
Stelarc (2005), Extended body: interview with Stelarc, Digital Delirium, on line at 
http://www.stanford.edu/dept/HPS/stelarc/a29-extended_body.html accessed at 05.07.2008. 
Suler, J. (1998), Adolescents in cyberspace: the good, the bad, and the ugly. The Psychology 
of Cyberspace, on line at http://www.rider.edu/users/suler/psycyber/psycyber.html accessed 
05.07.2008. 
Sullivan, K. (2000), The Anti-bullying handbook, Oxford University Press, New York. 
Tavani, H. (2007), Floridi´s ontological theory of information privacy: some implications and 
challenges, In Hinman, L. et al. (eds), The Seventh International Conference of Computer 
Ethics: Philosophical Enquiry, Center for Telematics and Information Technology, Enschede, 
385-396. 
Turkle, S. (1997), Constructions of self in virtual reality, In Kiesler, S. (ed), Culture of the 
internet, Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, 143-155. 
Waterman, A. (1992), Identity as an aspect of optimal psychological functioning, In Adams, 
G., Gulllotta, T. and Montemayor, R. (eds), Adolescent identity formation, Sage, Newbury 
Park, 50-72. 
Wiener, N. (1950), The human use of human beings: cybernetics and society, Doubleday 
Anchor Books, Boston. 
Ybarra, M. and Mitchell, K. (2004), Online aggressor/targets, aggressors, and targets: a 
comparison of associated youth characteristics, Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 
45, 7, 1308-1316. 
